Changing economic role of the state from a Turkish perspective by Economic Research Forum et al.
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC 
ROLE OF THE STATE FROM A 
TURKISH PERSPECTIVE 
Fikret Adaman & Murat Sertel 
Working Paper 9510 
/ly-) 5 5- 
Please address correspondence to: Fikret Adaman, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics & 
Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, P.K.2, Bebek 80815, Istanbul, Turkey. Fax: 90 212 265 1479. 
TI CHANGnr.7 EC011101-C ROLE OF THE STATE FROM A 
TURKISH PERSPECTIVE* 
Filet Ada man** 
and 
Murat R. Sertel 
*This is the revised version of a paper presented at the ERF Conference on "The Changing Role of the State in 
Economic Development and Growth" held in Rabat, Morocco on 8-10 January,1995. The Conference was made 
possible through the generous contribution of the European Commission. 
**Fikret Adaman is with the Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 80815,Turkey. Murat Sertel is 
at the Turkish Academy of Sciences and Bogazici University. 
Abstract 
The paper discusses from an institutionalist perspective the role of the state, with an 
emphasis on ownership traditions (private and public) in the Turkish case. A historical 
glimpse of ownership traditions is followed by an account of the rationale for both the 
etatism and " regulation by participation" as experienced during the Republican era. The 
paper discusses privatization and the new role of the state. An account is given of the 
present status of privatization, briefly evaluating the outcome. The effects of ownership 
structure on efficiency are then discussed. Finally, the new role of the state is outlined, 
emphasizing the need for a new form of regulation if public firms are to vanish and 
regulation by particiaption disappear. Workers' enterprises are suggested as an alternative 
form of privatization. 
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Introduction: the age of economic design 
The `institutionalist' theme, most vividly spelled out by Douglass C. North (Nobel 
Laureate 1993), attempts to explain the existence and rationale of political, legal, economic 
or, in general, social institutions by reference to a model of interaction between individuals 
and institutions, where the latter are seen as "the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, [as] the humanly devised constraint that shapes human interaction" (North, 
1990:3). In this framework, institutions are conceptualized, first, as providing the basic 
structure by which human beings throughout history have created order and attempted to 
reduce uncertainty; and, second, as determining, together with the technology employed, 
transaction and transformation costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging 
in economic activity.1 The analysis of institutional structures constitutes, therefore, a very 
important step in understanding both past and present economic performance, a critical 
evaluation of which might help us design and propose new mechanisms which would 
enhance economic performance. 
The changing economic role of the Turkish state can also be viewed within this 
perspective. Based on observations relating to Turkey's past and present institutional 
structure, this paper will attempt to evaluate the role of the Turkish state, and then to 
propose new guidelines towards improving economic performance. 
Turkey should perhaps be recognized as a self-inspecting, self-designing country, 
unlike the West, which is perhaps self-content, even complacent in part. Today in Turkey, 
discussions over a variety of institutional questions - ranging from reforming the electoral 
system to the economic and social implications of privatization, from the optimal size of 
parliament to the pros and cons of an alternative, presidential, system - are buoyant and 
attract wide and very active participation from very different strata, voicing a need for 
restructuring the present system. This reinforces our drive to focus on the formation and 
operation of institutions in Turkey, as the mode through which economies are organized 
and controlled 
An institutionalist look over our shoulders 
When Constantinople fell on 29 May 1453, the Podesta of Galata, the local 
Genoese settlement, quickly sought favor with the Turks. The latter ordered the gates to be 
opened, and Genoese envoys were sent out to request a confirmation of religious and 
1 For a recent survey, see Hodgson (1993). 
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commercial liberties previously enjoyed under the Byzantine emperors.2 It took only three 
days for Fatih Mehmet, as the new Eastern Roman Emperor, to sign this grant to the 
inhabitants of Galata, unilaterally guaranteeing their right to trade in his new and enlarged 
dominion, thus willingly foregoing his - and, what is more, effectively also his 
successors' - right to absolute and arbitrary rule in this matter. It is striking that he should 
of his own will choose to make such a promise, especially at a time when his power was at 
its peak, unchallenged by any other contemporary world power. His decision later 
received heavy criticism, but it was certainly a strategic one, undoubtedly setting forth 
crystal-clear property rights for a group of the world's best traders, giving them the most 
certain shelter of law and order, as well as protection from political interference. This was 
in a world in which everywhere else tradesmen had to bribe the local nobility and pay them 
tolls and fees at every crossroad, and a world in which extended religious and other wars 
and strife made trade no riskless occupation. 
Another most striking fact about Fatih Mehmet's promise to the Galata inhabitants 
is its language. The document was written, not in Turkish, Italian or Latin, but in Greek, 
the language of the Eastern Roman Empire. Fatih Mehmet was not making a historical joke 
when he claimed the Eastern Roman Empire as its Emperor. And this should serve as a 
clear reminder to us all of what this young emperor did in the economic, legal, 
administrative and general social sphere. For he took over Byzantium, adopting and 
adapting much of its institutions, methods and administrative traditions and machinery to 
the needs of an expanding, energetic modern state composed of many ethnic groups, 
creeds, languages, and many and diverse needs. He did not crush the civilization that he 
had defeated at war. Instead, by exchanging blood with the basically nomadic traditions in 
administration that had brought the Oguz Turks in 1453, he gave the polity a new and 
economically viable life. 
Unlike in a country following the Magna Carta tradition, where property owners 
got together to agree on the rules, Fatih Mehmet was, of course, the owner of all. But 
despite his omnipotence, he signed an accord which he must have thought would be good 
for business - his business. In so many ways, it is evident that Fatih was an 
institutionalist. The institution of fratricide was not his only mark on the future of the 
Ottoman Turkish state. He adopted and adapted Roman-Byzantine institutions and coined 
some of his own. The state as the business organization of its owner - the ruler - was a 
feature of the Turkish state well into the nineteenth century, exceptions being made to 
foreigners and minorities, which allowed them to own certain forms of property. A lesson 
2 From information given by the British Museum (February 1995), displaying the 
document of the next sentence. This document is also reproduced in Concina (1994). 
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to be derived from the Ottoman period is that the existence of clearly-defined property 
rights makes for good economics, thus escaping the uncertainties of vagueness and 
avoiding the commons problem by concentrating ownership in the hands of an individual - 
those of the Padisah. 3 
With the birth of the Republic in 1923, while subjects became citizens and the 
private ownership of property was placed on a pedestal, the large proprietor-state also 
undertook the duty of building itself up in order to function better in its new, self-ascribed 
duty of serving the nation, and this entailed its entering the economic world as produce . 
Thus, during the period of etatism, the state aimed to establish the main industries, all in the 
absence of any private capital accumulation and despite a genuine shortage of human 
capital. Adopted as official ideology in 1931, etatism gained momentum in 1934 with the 
commencement of the five-year plan period, although it slowed down in the late 1940s. 
Here we were, again, at institution building, and the etatist order was designed to achieve a 
set of interrelated targets: building an infrastructure; producing a variety of 
intermediary/capital goods; creating human capital; ameliorating or curing regional 
imbalances; and, as an entrepreneur-state, bearing risk and confronting the typical 
uncertainties awaiting any new business in newly opened markets (Boratav 1974; Aysan 
and Ozmen ' 1981; Karatas 1986; Kepenek 1990). These targets can be said to have been 
met with success: Turkey's GDP growth rate between 1929-1950 was 83 percent - a 
relatively high magnitude when compared, for example, with those of India, Egypt, 
Yugoslavia and Greece for the same period: 21, 59, 30, and -12 percent (Tezel 1982:450). 
The role of industry in the Turkish economy also grew during this period; its share in the 
GDP increased from 15 percent in the early 1930s to 19 percent in the late 1940s (Tezel, 
1982:451). That is where the state took a leading position. Even in 1950, when the state 
started to step back from production activity, one-third of the value added in the 
manufacturing sector and more than the half of the value-added in mining were created by 
public enterprises (DIE 1953: 284). Another striking fact regarding what the state achieved 
in the etatist period is that, out of all entrepreneurs established between 1931 and 1940 and 
employing a work force of 50 employees or more in 1968, 78 percent had had an early 
work experience in the public sector - proving the state's contribution in enhancing the 
development of human capital (Soral 1974: 39-43). 
3 It is worth recalling at this point that since `exclusivity' - the right to determine who may 
use a scarce resource in a particular way - and `alienability' - the right to reassign 
ownership to someone else - are both absent when the ownership of scarce resources is 
communal (to use the definition in Demsetz 1988), everyone would be individually better 
off by exploiting that communal property regardless of what others do, thus bringing about 
an inefficient outcome known as the `tragedy of commons' (Hardin, 1968). 
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Later, starting in the late 1950s, we see the period of the mixed economy, or the 
period of `planned industrialization', steered by the newly-established State Planning 
Organization (1961), which followed its own particular ideology. Here we observe the 
interesting institutional device of `regulation by participation' (Sertel 1988) - a topic to be 
addressed below. Very Turkish, but also seen in Western Europe, notably in France, for 
example in the automotive industry (such as Renault), and in Italy. What we have here is 
the public hand entering production, not as a monopoly, but rather as one of several 
producers, and with the explicit goal of influencing - and, thus, indirectly regulating - the 
behavior of its competitors when the unregulated operation of private industry is 
unsatisfactory. As such, the participation of the public hand in productive activity exerts a 
regulatory effect on others, increasing the efficiency of the allocative operation of markets 
where competition is insufficient. 
During these years main targets became the achievement of economic growth, 
structural change from agriculture towards industry, and the diversification of the export 
base of the country to finance increasing import needs of the economy. Along with this, 
the Turkish state aimed at developing import-competing product lines, and engaged in 
regulation of imperfectly competitive markets, even directly participating in production as 
well as giving overall support to industrial activity and exports. In this context, the first 
phase of the import-substitution regime, which aimed at replacing imports of non-durable 
goods, was successfully implemented between 1963 and 1973. Owing much to the 
changing international climate and external shocks, however, the attempt to substitute for 
imports of consumer durables, intermediate and investment goods, known as `the second 
phase', proved to be no great success (Akder et. al. 1987; Boratav 1988; Onis 1993; 
cakmakci 1994; Kepenek and YentUrk 1994). 
The years 1977-1980, preceding the 1980 adjustment program, are generally 
known as the `crisis years'. This crisis was characterized mainly by macroeconomic 
instability as well as social and industrial strife. The country saw very high rates of price 
inflation, debt crises that went hand in hand with worsening international creditworthiness, 
and negative growth rates arising from supply bottlenecks and import scarcities due to 
foreign exchange shortages. Here, part of the problem had started with the oil shock and 
the consequences of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, all of which placed the 
economy under severe strain. At the same time, economic difficulties were accompanied 
by political turmoil. Towards the end of this period, the government attempted to 
`revitalize' the economy with a reform program designed by the direct participation of the 
World Bank and the IMF, which came into effect on 24 January 1980. The country then 
experienced a coup d'etat in September of that year, and the military regime virtually 
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suppressed all opposition groups and acted as a protector/guarantor of the 24 January 
economic program. 
The reform program was a rather `standard' one, arguing in favor of, inter alia, 
trade and financial liberalization, domestic demand restraint and suppression of the wage 
rate (Boratav, 1988:122 et seq.). What was new, however, was the accompanying 
discourse: For the last decade and a half we have been presented with a so-called new 
`vision', which construes the state more or less as its disciples have perceived the United 
States - not necessarily as the United States is, but as they seem to have perceived it. This 
has brought us not only an ideology in favor of privatizing the state sector of the economy, 
but also a half-baked idea that we could more or less do without the state even in spheres 
such as public education and public health. It advocates a reduction of the role of the state 
in the economy but, ironically, its proponents have - if anything - extended the state's 
interference in more and more spheres of economic activity (Bugra 1994). 
During this era of the supremacy of private over public, and of private property 
over public, again ironically, property rights - both public and private - have also become 
more and more vague. This is perhaps most evident in the simplest tapu (deed to a piece 
of land). This most central Ottoman/Turkish institution, still used in some parts of the `old 
country', for instance in Israel, has been eroded in Turkey by the public hand itself. 
Indeed, the illegal occupation of private and public land has been encouraged by the public. 
The municipalities and parliament itself have been active in undermining the `sanctity' of 
property - private and public - and the proponents of this `sanctity' have been mostly to 
blame. It should go without saying that when someone builds an illegal wall, it should not 
be possible to forgive them and thus render their unlawful act legal. The cost is borne by 
the individual whose property is obstructed by the wall. Accordingly, theft cannot be 
pardoned by parliament and honesty expected to prevail. Where law and order cannot be 
guaranteed by the state, one can only speak of a return to the state of nature or of the filling 
of this vacuum by another, modern and more capable state. Needless to say, the lack of 
legal institutional arrangements also forms the basis for rent-seeking activities, as witnessed 
in Turkey. Respect for property rights would definitely imply a more efficient economic 
organizational structure. 
Nevertheless, the privatization issue has been very visible our agenda for over a 
decade (Aktan 1993; Ertuna 1993; Onder 1993). This is so long a period for a goal to be 
achieved that it is evident that words spoke louder than actions. In fact, by the end of 
1994, only about $2.3 billion worth of shares of public enterprises had been sold, and of 
these less than 30 percent were sales which turned over majority shares to private hands 
(PPA 1993). Of this magnitude, over a half was in a single industry, namely cement, 
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where court cases took several years to settle. Among the cement factories sold, five went 
to a French company. The sales to the French company were made en bloc, and it is 
difficult to decipher what reasoning, let alone economic calculus, was pursued by the 
public agencies making the sales. The pattern proceeded from West to East and from the 
most to the least profitable. Little consideration seems to have been given to how the 
government's portfolio of loss-making enterprises was to be financed once profitable firms 
were eliminated. For the year ending in September 1992, had 11 of the 17 privatized 
cement factories not been privatized, the conglomerate (;ITOSAN would have had a profit 
of $17.5 million rather than a loss of $9.8 million (Tallant 1993). What is more 
interesting, if not dramatic, is that the estimated profits over four years for the five plants 
purchased by the French company added up, broadly speaking, to the price they paid.4 
cakmak and Zaim (1992) also found that the private sector in cement has more or less the 
same physical efficiency (inputs/output) as the public sector, a finding that undermines the 
main rationale for privatization. The results reported in Tallant (1993) somehow confirm 
those of cakmak and Zaim. Although private and mixed-ownership cement plants are 
estimated to be more efficient in terms of labor productivity than public ones, Tallant clearly 
acknowledges the fact that "the better showing in physical measures is closely related to 
geographic location, which indicates that the initial location decision has had more to do 
with firm performance than public ownership per se" (Tallant 1993: 99-100). 
A great deal of debate has surrounded this matter, but even in an area where a 
nationwide consensus is said to exist, legislation to enact large-scale privatization has come 
only recently (27 November 1994), and many questions remain answered. This is not to 
speak of the nationalization of the steel industry (Asil celik), the dairy industry (Kars Siit), 
and in other instances where our private enterprise ideology has not hesitated to buy out 
failing private businesses. This is not to speak, of course, of the nationalization or 
otherwise bailing out of several private banks and financial institutions over the last decade. 
A very recent development (February 1995) in this regard was the attempt to sell two public 
enterprises (Kardemir and Et ve Balik Kurumu) to their dominant labor unions. The idea 
of transferring property and employers' rights to a labor union seemed to lack serious 
preparation and discussion, and proved to be sufficiently unworkable that the government, 
meeting with much criticism, had to reconsider its decision. 
From the sluggishness of legislative action in privatization, as reported above, we 
could draw two types of conclusions. One is that the consensus in favor of privatization is 
not as wide and strong as claimed. Another is that we have evolved this state into one 
4 We owe this information to E. cakmak and O. Zaim (Department of Economics, Bilkent 
University). 
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which simply cannot compose and pass requisite legislation, even where there is a strong 
consensus. There may be some truth in both of these. In support of the first view, the 
research of Erguder et. al. (1992), for example, indicates that Turkish people in general do 
not have a strong preference towards private as opposed to public ownership.5 This 
suggests that, in spite of the official discourse favoring privatization, in fact the cultural 
plasma of the country turns out not to be in agreement with the party line. As for the 
second view, if the legislative machinery is expected to be sluggish, as experience seems to 
confirm, this would mean that we should design a system which does not require frequent, 
fine-tuning legislative action. 
The Privatization Debate6 
It goes without saying that the crux of the privatization debate revolves around the 
relative efficiency performance of private versus public firms. To begin with, the 
efficiency criterion should be clarified. There seems to be a general tendency to treat 
efficiency as an indicator very closely related, if not identical, to profits. In the case of 
Turkey, for example, the usual public discourse on privatization tends to witness the 
presentation of loss figures pertaining to public firms as the rationale for a full-scale 
privatization. Of course, profit (as it appears in accounting statements) is in no sense a 
reliable indicator of efficiency, showing only the difference between sales revenues and 
costs. Instead, an economist must insist that the efficiency criterion should be conceived 
with the two usual components of productive (technical) efficiency, concerned with just 
how low a cost of inputs is incurred in producing any level of output, and allocative 
efficiency, concerned with how competitively the firm behaves in the markets. 
First, regarding productive efficiency, the empirical evidence, generally speaking, 
tells us that, if anything, we are not in a position to conclude decisively which form of 
enterprise, public or private, is the superior form (Cave and Christensen 1980; Millward 
and Parker 1983; Vickers and Yarrow 1988). In the specific case of Turkey, such a 
comparative study seems to be a challenge. In order to accomplish such a study, however, 
three different methods can be used. (For a recent discussion on Turkey, see Boratav et. 
5 A total of 1030 subjects were asked to indicate their preferences regarding the ownership 
status of enterprises on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 standing for pure private property and 10 
standing for pure public property. Those who reported 1 and 2 (strong support for private 
ownership) constituted 18.4 percent of the total sample, as compared with 31.6 percent 
who reported 9 and 10 (strong support for public ownership). As this research constitutes 
a part of an international study, its results can also be compared with those for other 
countries. Of the 23 countries covered in the larger study, only in Nigeria did people 
indicate a stronger preference for public property than in Turkey. 
6 Some parts of this section draw on Adaman (1993). 
al. 1993). The first one is to directly compare the efficiency (such as labor, capital and total 
productivity) figures of private vs. public firms. Although from a methodological point of 
view there seems to be nothing wrong with this approach, it requires the compared private 
and public firms to share similar structures, both technologically and environmentally. In 
the case of Turkey, this condition is very difficult to meet, unfortunately, as one very 
seldom finds firms of different ownership structures in similar relevant conditions. The 
cement industry turns out to be an exception and, as indicated in the two studies cited 
above, here one can safely claim that public and private firms are generally on a par in 
technical efficiency. The second way of comparing the efficiency of public versus private 
plants is to conduct a cost-benefit analysis by computing inputs, outputs and value added 
on the basis of social prices. An obvious difficulty here lies in the computation of social 
prices. The third method is to estimate production functions of private and public firms and 
then contrast them on the basis of the differences between their potential and actual output 
levels. The difficulty here has to do with the unsettled debate about the methodological 
problems regarding the definition of production functions. In view of such methodological 
problems, a full-scale comparison has yet to be conducted for the case of Turkey. A partial 
analysis, however, could pinpoint the fluctuations in public firms' efficiency over the years 
and then try to explain their variations. This path has recently been explored by Boratav et. 
al. (1993), and their finding is that productivity figures started to deteriorate in 1987 over 
the 1980-1992 period. Further investigation has led them to conclude that this deterioration 
has a strong correlation with the decline of investment expenditures. 
The productive efficiency question is typically approached via the principal-agent 
theory, which focuses on the effects of ownership on the monitoring of a managerial body. 
Public ownership of a firm is not the ownership of the firm by the general public in the 
pure sense of each citizen owning a tradable share in the firm. Rather, the firm is owned 
by a public agency which acts as proprietor on behalf of citizens. Under private - as 
opposed to public - ownership, it is claimed that two separate mechanisms would ensure 
that managers do not deviate from profit maximization (Pryke 1981; Demsetz 1988). The 
first consists of shareholders' control over managers, and the second is the discipline 
implemented by the capital market in the form of takeovers and the difficulty in raising 
additional capital. In the first, it is argued that the voting mechanism gives shareholders 
ultimate control over management. Shareholders, being the residual claimants, bear the 
direct consequences of managerial actions and therefore have the ultimate incentive to 
control the management team, with the implication that once inappropriate behavior by 
managers is detected they will be subject to dismissal. In the second, it is claimed that 
when misbehavior of managers is reflected in the stock and bond prices of the firm, two 
mechanisms will be operative, thus disciplining managers. For one, if a management team 
is performing poorly, a potential takeover bidder may see this as an opportunity and 
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purchase the firm, and the new management will run the firm more efficiently. In addition, 
inefficient managers will find it more difficult to raise additional capital, and in the final 
analysis might have to face bankruptcy. 
Yet, the above explanation has a few flaws. First, regarding shareholders' 
discipline, two reservations have to be noted. The first has to do with the implicit 
assumption that shareholders always maximize their (expected) profit from the company. 
There might well be some cases (e.g. consumers of a monopolist's product holding a 
substantial fraction of its share) in which a rational shareholder would find it beneficial not 
to ask the manager to maximize the firm's profit (Hart 1979; Vickers and Yarrow 1988). 
As for the second reservation, if all shareholders hold insignificant fractions of the total 
securities of the firm, none would have much incentive to monitor the firm's performance. 
As Stiglitz asserts (1985: 136): 
"Since there is always some cost associated both with obtaining information to 
determine whether a manager is a good manager and with evaluating alternative 
management teams, in other words, to voting intelligently, and there is a negligible benefit, 
no rational shareholder should expend the resources required to vote intelligently." 
Furthermore, the discipline of the capital market is not without its own problems 
either. Regarding its alleged effects on takeovers, three reservations can be raised. First, 
faced with the observation that a firm is not performing well, a potential bidder must know 
whether this poor performance has arisen due to bad management by the existing 
managerial team or due to some exogenous conditions which were beyond the control of 
the existing team (such as mistakes made by previous management), thus bringing about an 
information problem. Secondly, the incumbent management team could pursue a set of 
strategic actions in order to avoid being taken over. Thirdly, foreseeing a takeover offer, a 
typical rational shareholder would find it profitable not to sell his shares, waiting rather for 
the takeover to be finalized, after which his share would sell for a higher price. Regarding 
the difficulty in raising capital, two drawbacks must be noted. First, only the managers of 
firms with attractive investment prospects are likely to concern themselves with the efficient 
utilization of resources in order to raise additional capital. As Stiglitz (1985:139) argues, 
"for other firms with poor investment opportunities, the threat of the denial of access to 
future capital is not an effective control mechanism". Secondly, should the probability of 
bankruptcy arise, the managerial team may think that the firm will go out of business 
regardless of the decisions they make, and so may decide to enjoy managerial discretion to 
the fullest possible extent in the short term (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). Therefore, as in 
the case of the threat of takeover, difficulties in raising capital may cause the management 
team to shorten decision-making horizons. 
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Taking all these drawbacks into account, there exists no solid ground for the 
argument that under private ownership the monitoring of managerial activities will be done 
efficiently. Dispersed shareholders will be inclined to free-ride, and capital markets need 
not function efficiently enough to exercise discipline over managers. Yet, if we were to 
insist that a capital market, however inefficient, will have an efficiency-enhancing role in 
the sense of taming managers, then it seems plausible to imitate the functioning of a capital 
market tinder public ownership, as Bardhan and Roemer (1992) recently proposed. 
In Bardhan and Roemer's scheme, the government initially distributes a fixed 
number of coupons to all citizens, who use them to purchase the stock of firms, 
denominated not in regular currency but in said coupons. Owning a share of a firm entitles 
the citizen to a share of the firm's profits. The shares of firms cannot be purchased, but 
they can be traded for shares in other firms. Prices of coupons will therefore oscillate as 
they do on a regular stock market. Everyone's coupon portfolio must be returned to the 
public treasury at death, and allocations of coupons are continually to be made to new 
generations. This `pseudo' stock market, then, "should provide the same signals that a 
capitalist stock market does, apart from providing some risk-bearing by citizens", forcing 
managers to act properly (Bardhan and Roemer 1992:110). The conclusion to be drawn is 
that, facing the issue of monitoring managers, the effects of ownership structure on 
productive efficiency may be a priori indeterminate. 
The issue of productive efficiency has a second dimension as well. Many matters 
which cannot be effectively steered right by proper organization (for instance, via proper 
principal-agent relations) and by proper management can only be set right through an 
appropriate partnership market where providers of resources can buy in as partners or can 
be bought out by others who offer enough to purchase their partnership deeds. The 
literature on workers' enterprises (WEs) and, more generally, about `factoristic firms' 
(Sertel 1991) centers its analysis on a partnership market which determines the efficient 
employment of factors of production without an employer (e.g., an entrepreneur or a labor- 
managed firm's (LMF) management) deciding on how much of these factors to hire subject 
to a price schedule. After all, it is thanks to the worker-partnership market that a WE 
behaves as if it were a profit-maximizing entrepreneurial firm, although it has no 
entrepreneur deciding on the employment of labor, a factor of production that it can employ 
only as embodied in its partners. 
At this point, it would be wise to outline briefly the distinction between WEs and 
LMFs in order to better understand what a worker-partnership deed market would bring us. 
The tradition following the contributions of Ward (1958), Domar (1966) and Vanek (1970) 
takes as its point of departure the assumption that in LMFs the aim is to maximize the 
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dividend per worker-member, defined as the value-added per worker. More specifically, 
the LMF chooses inputs in the short and long run so as to maximize the value-added per 
worker. The consequence of the Ward-Domar-Vanek assumption regarding the behavior 
of LMFs, however, is that of inefficiency and perversity. (For a general discussion see, 
for example, Bonin and Putterman 1987, as well as Kleindorfer and Sertel 1994). 
To begin with, three main problems are expected to arise when capital is assumed to 
be fixed. First, LMFs will be smaller than their capitalist twins if profits are positive. Note 
that if there is a positive profit, the profit that goes to shareholders in a capitalist twin firm 
would be divided among workers in a LMF, making the value-added per worker greater 
than the ongoing wage rate. Assuming that the marginal product of labor is decreasing, the 
LMF has to use, under the positive profit scenario, less labor in order to attain the 
optimality condition, bringing about inefficiency. Moreover, LMFs would behave 
perversely in response to autonomous shifts in the product price, lowering (increasing) 
their labor force, and thus output, when the price rises (falls). Lastly, if there is a positive 
profit and the value-added per worker differs among LMFs, labor allocation in the LMF 
economy would not be Pareto optimal. Clearly, a reallocation of labor toward the LMF 
with the higher value-added per worker from the LMF with a lower one would increase 
total output in the economy. The main problem in the long run, on the other hand, is that if 
there is a positive profit, the maximized value-added per worker will exceed the ongoing 
wage rate, thus the choice of technique will be more capital intensive than the optimal 
combination level. Finally, an under-investment malady has long been attributed to LMFs: 
Due to the anticipated finiteness of their tenure, members, unable to fully appropriate the 
cash flow results of internal investment, would adopt a higher effective discount rate and 
underinvest (Furubotn, 1976). Furthermore, as Fehr (1992) noted, due to the fact that 
initial members of LMFs are subject to expropriation by newcomers, there would again be 
an incentive to underinvest. In other words, incumbent workers cannot internalize the 
benefits from growth, even if they bear the cost of growth. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the design of LMFs is fundamentally flawed. 
The main surprise, however, is that they have occupied, and still occupy, the attention of 
so many economists to date. (For a relatively recent contribution see, for example, Dreze 
1989). There have been many attempts to cure this flawed structure. (For a review, see 
Bonin and Putterman 1987). Yet, none has succeeded in properly answering all the above 
deficiencies. 
Should the firm's shares and capital structure be valued and sold to employees, 
however, then the persistent perverse and inefficient character of the LMFs would vanish. 
This avenue was first explored by Sertel (1982), with further contributions by Dow 
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(1986), Sertel (1987 and 1991), and Kleindorfer and Sertel (1994). In Sertel's system, 
any expansion of the membership list requires the approval of both newcomers and current 
members. Likewise, any contraction can only be realized if those who retire as well as 
those who stay give their mutual consent. Therefore, not only does the WE unanimously 
agree to adjust capital variable so as to maximize the value-added per worker, but also the 
size of the membership list is itself subject to the worker-partnership market. As such, "[a] 
deed price at which no sellers can find buyers and no buyers can find sellers will not only 
be an equilibrium deed price, but will also correspond to a rest point in the formation of the 
firm and to an equilibrium firm size" (Sertel, 1987: 1621; our emphasis). 
Obviously, the issue of how efficiently this deed market would function still 
remains, and one may assume that imperfections similar to those which were mentioned in 
the case of capital markets are likely to repeat themselves. Parallel to what has been said 
above, however, it is possible to claim that an intermediary organization might facilitate the 
functioning of this deed market. Indeed, the experience of the Mondragon cooperative 
movement in the Basque region of Spain seems to support this claim. On an a priori basis, 
it should not be possible to claim the advantage of one type of market over the other. 
Two types of lessons may be drawn from the above. For one, the divorce of public 
firms from an ownership market could very well be the cause of economically pathological 
behavior on their part, even if they were not subject to the politically valid favoritism 
syndrome outlined above. Furthermore, as WEs do not suffer from this divorce from an 
ownership market, or from any divorce of ownership from management, they may very 
well offer a viable alternative form of private organization and ownership structure for the 
public firms which we may want to privatize. (For more along these lines, see Sertel 
1995f). 
The whole corrective and regulatory device of an ownership market is dispensed 
with when we place a firm under the vague `public' ownership of the citizenry rather than 
issuing tradable shares to citizens. By selling or giving shares to the citizens, for example 
by selling or giving shares to the employees of public firms, we can directly cure these 
firms of at least this one structural handicap. When government privatizes a firm, instead 
of issuing stock to the citizens and allowing them to trade, it may prefer to sell stock in their 
name, for the latter course allows the government to decide also on how to spend the 
proceeds of the sale. The citizens may, however, prefer to decide for themselves on how 
to spend their own wealth, for public firms are, after all, the citizens' property. 
After having discussed the productive efficiency aspect of different ownership 
structures, let us now turn our attention to the issue of allocative efficiency. 
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When the operation of private industry is unsatisfactory due to imperfections in 
competition, two alternative forms of public intervention in regulating the malfunctioning of 
these markets seem to have been traditionally considered. One alternative is for the public 
to appoint a regulatory authority in charge of curing the imperfections arising due to such 
an imperfection, with the aim of increasing the industry output to the level that would occur 
under perfect competition, and this with a menu of various tools to apply. The second 
alternative is for the public itself to produce the output in accordance with said allocative 
efficiency criteria (Bos 1986). Although from a theoretical perspective the two alternatives 
should produce the same allocative outcome, the empirical evidence clearly indicates that 
publicly owned firms are generally readier to undertake measures to enhance allocative 
efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). A third - hybrid, alternative - `regulation by 
participation' (Sertel 1988) aims to insert public firms in an imperfectly competitive 
environment in order to prevent the monopolization of the market and the exploitation of the 
consumer. The behavior of the public firm entering into an imperfectly competitive 
situation would influence the behavior of its competitors or fellow inhabitants in the 
industry, and its participation would thus have a regulatory effect on others. "A public 
enterprise is to be judged, therefore, not in terms of its own efficiency alone, but also in 
terms of its effect on the efficiency of the industry as a whole" (Sertel 1988: 112). As we 
have mentioned above, this mechanism has been, and still is, applied in the case of Turkey, 
correcting many allocative problems and thus increasing social welfare. What is very 
striking in the privatization debate in Turkey is the almost total lack of reference to the 
regulatory functioning of the public sector, although this institutional device has been 
especially important in this country. 
Looking forward 
If we were now to look forward as economic designers who understand the critical 
role of institution-building for the wealth of nations (as the old economists would call what 
we now refer to as social welfare), what general principles might we wish to lay out as 
guidelines for the future institutional design of this society? The choice of which particular 
institutional design one should prescribe is a highly technical question, and hence beyond 
the scope of this paper. It is bound to remain a topic for debate over many years to come in 
a society like Turkey, which continually seeks self-improvement by conscious design. We 
should, however, ask for guidelines which say something about the major aims of 
legislation and its enforceability, and we should inquire as to whether there is anything 
special about Turkey which might alert us to the need for one attribute in our designs more 
than others. In asking these questions, we should keep abreast of all historical and social 
psychological information pertinent to Turkey. 
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In answering "What creates efficient institutions?", we should perhaps start by 
asking whether there is a possibility that Turkey's institutional structure may lack the 
formal enforcement structure that underpins efficient markets, causing informal activities to 
step into this vacuum. Such an informal structure would come with high costs, however, 
"because the lack of formal property right safeguards restricts activity to personalized 
exchange systems that can provide self-enforcing types of contracts" (North 1990: 67; a 
footnote is omitted). This surely constitutes one of the economic institutional realities of 
Turkey, but its magnitude is hard to judge in the absence of relevant research. 
In seeking how to build and enforce institutions, we might want to keep our minds open to 
the wisdom encapsulated in a couple of sayings which probably reflect relevant social 
psychological background information. Let us recall these two very telling Turkish sayings 
to reflect the Turkish setting of social values, traditions and expectations in whose context 
institutional design has to be contemplated in this country: 
Sayings: 
A. "Turk, tavsani kagniyla avlar." (A Turk will hunt down a hare with an ox cart.) 
B. "Padisah yasagi bir gun surer." (The Padisah's forbidness will last but a day.) 
Lessons for the designer of economic institutions: 
a. Devise rules which are simple to judge, because some legal processes, although they 
may ultimately catch the culprit, may take very long. 
b. Devise rules which are difficult to change, and make sure that those who infringe such 
rules will be punished accordingly. 
These combine to imply rather mechanical, automatic, irreversible sanctions, 
leaving little room for human judgement, hence entailing little rent-seeking in courts. 
Accordingly, the plunder of common or private property will be discouraged if pardons are 
no longer available and offenders are actually prosecuted. 
But there might be more to the issue than simply higher transaction costs. The 
totality of institutional constraints may define a set of payoffs to political and economic 
activity that would not encourage unproductive activity. As claimed by North (1990: 67): 
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"With insecure property rights, poorly enforced laws, barriers to entry, and 
monopolistic restrictions, profit-maximizing firms will tend to have short time horizons and 
little fixed capital, and will tend to be small scale. The most profitable business may be in 
trade, redistributive activities, or the black market. Large firms with substantial fixed 
capital will exist only under the umbrella of government protection with subsidies, tariff 
protection, and payoffs to the polity - a mixture hardly conducive to productive efficiency." 
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